Canadian Autonomy History

Canadian Autonomy History in the XIX Century

Note: for posterior historical period, see the entry about Canadian Autonomy here.
During these years, and until late in 1845, Lord Stanley presided at the Colonial Office. Naturally of an arrogant and unyielding temper, and with something of the convert’s fanatic devotion to the political creed of his adoption, he administered Canada avowedly on the lines of Lord John Russell’s despatch to Poulett Thomson, but with all the emphasis on the limitations prescribed in that despatch, and in a spirit singularly irritating. His conduct towards Bagot exhibited a consistent distrust of Canadian self-government; and the fundamental defects of his advice to Bagot’s successor cannot be better exhibited than in the letter warning Metcalfe of “the extreme risk which would attend any disruption of the present Conservative party of Canada. Their own steadinessand your own firmness and discretion have gone far towards consolidating them as a party and securing a stable administration of the colony.”[Stanley to Metcalfe, 18 June, 1845].

In spite of the warnings of Durham and Buller, Stanley was aiming at restoring all the ancient landmarks—an unpopular executive, a small privileged party “of the connexion,” and a colony quickly and surely passing from the control of Britain. Even after Stanley’s resignation, and the accession of an avowed Peelite and free-trader, Gladstone, to his office, the change in commercial theory did not at first effect any change in the Colonial Office interpretation of the Canadian constitution. No doubt Gladstone recommended Cathcart to ascertain the deliberate sense of the Canadian community at large, and pay respect to the House of Assembly as the organ of that sense, but he committed himself and the new governor-general to a strong support of Metcalfe’s system, and put him on his guard against “dishonourable abstract declarations on the subject of what has been termed responsible government.”[Gladstone to Cathcart, 3 February, 1846]

It would be tedious to follow the subject into every detail of Canadian administration; but all existing evidence tends to prove that the representative men of the British Tory party opposed the new interpretation of Canadian rights at every crisis in the period. In the Rebellion Losses debate in 1849, Gladstone, taking in this matter a view more restricted than that of his leader Peel, held that Elgin should have referred to the Home Government at the very first moment, and before public opinion had been appealed to in the colony.[Gladstone’s speech in Hansard, 14 June, 1849] The fall of the Whig ministry in 1851 was followed by the first of three brief Derby administrations: and the Earl of Derby proved himself to be more wedded than he had been as Lord Stanley to the old restrictive system.

The Clergy Reserve dispute was nearing its end, but Derby and Sir John Pakington, his colonial secretary, intervened to introduce one last delay, and to give the Bishop of Toronto his last gleam of hope. The appointment of Pakington, which, according to Taylor, was treated with very general ridicule, was in itself significant: even an ignorant and retrograde politician was adequate for his task when that task was obstruction. After the short-lived Derby administration was over, Pakington continued his defence of Anglican rights in Canada, and although Canadian opinion had declared itself overwhelmingly on the other side, he refused to admit that “the argument of self-government was so paramount that it ought to over-rule the sacred dedication of this property.”

So far nothing unexpected has been revealed in the early Victorian colonial policy of the Tories. The party naturally and logically opposed all forms of democratic control; they stood for the strict subordination of the outlying regions to the centre in the administration of dependencies; they were, as they had always and everywhere been, the party of the Church, and of church endowment. But it is surprising to find that the party of Wellington and of British supremacy varied their doctrine of central authority with very pessimistic prophecies concerning the connection between mother country and colonies.

Stanley has already been exhibited, during the Bagot and Metcalfe incidents, as a prophet of pessimism; and at the same period, Peel seems to have shared in the views of his Colonial Secretary. “Let us keep Nova Scotia and New Brunswick,” he said, “but the connection with the Canadas against their wills, nay without the cordial co-operation of the predominant party in Canada, is a very onerous one. The sooner we have a distinct understanding on that head the better. The advantage of commercial intercourse is all on the side of the colony, or at least is not in favour of the mother country. Why should we go on fighting not our own battle (I speak now of a civil battle) but theirs—in a minority in the Legislature, the progress of the contest widening daily old differences and begetting new ones! But above all, if the people are not cordially with us, why should we contract the tremendous obligation of having to defend, on a point of honour, their territory against American aggression?”[Parker, Life of Sir Robert Peel, iii. p. 389].

Ten years later, Tory pessimists still talked of separation. Lord John Manners, in an oration which showed as much rhetorical effort as it did little sense and information, was prepared for disaster over no more tragic an issue than the Clergy Reserves. Concession to local demands on that point for him involved something not far from disruption of the Empire. “Far better than this, if you really believe it to be necessary to acknowledge the virtual independence of Canada, recall your Governor-General, call back your army, call home your fleet, and let Canada, if she be so minded, establish her independence and cast off her character as a colony, or seek refuge in the extended arms of the United States.”[Hansard, 4 March, 1853] But perhaps it is not fair to confront a man with his perorations.

The most remarkable confession of Tory doubt still remains to be told. It is not usually noticed that Disraeli’s famous phrase “these wretched colonies will all be independent too in a few years, and are a mill-stone round our necks,”[Memoirs of an Ex-Minister, i. p. 344: Disraeli to Malmesbury, 13 August, 1852] was used in connection with Canadian fishery troubles, and belongs to this same region of imperial pessimism. There is, however, another less notorious but perfectly explicit piece of evidence betraying the fears which at this time disturbed the equanimity of the founder of modern imperialism. He had been speaking of the attempts of liberalism to effect the disintegration of the Empire; but the speech, which contained his counter-scheme of imperial consolidation, was itself an evidence of doubt deeper than that harboured by his opponents. “When those subtle views were adopted by the country, under the plausible plea of granting self-government to the Colonies, I confess that I myself thought that the tie was broken. Not that I for one object to self-government. I cannot conceive how our distant colonies can have their affairs administered except by self-government. But self-government, in my opinion, when it is conceded, ought to have been conceded as part of a great policy of Imperial consolidation.”[The Speeches of the Earl of Beaconsfield, ii. p. 530]

Disraeli was speaking of the views on colonial government, which he had held, apparently at the time when Grey and Elgin introduced their new system. That system had since been developed under Gladstone’s supervision; and, in 1872, the date of Disraeli’s speech, it presented not fewer, but more decided signs of colonial independence. Yet the statesman who accused the Whigs and Liberals of planning the disruption of the Empire, never attempted, when in office, to stay the decline of imperial unity by any practical scheme of federation, and must be counted either singularly indifferent to the interests of the empire, or sceptical as to its future.

A few years later, when the Imperial Titles Bill was under discussion, Disraeli again revealed a curious disbelief in, or misunderstanding of, the character of the self-governing colonies. He had been challenged to defend his differentiation of the royal title in India from that authorized in the rest of the British Empire. It would have been easy to confess that an imperial dignity, appropriate to the East, would have been singularly out of place in communities more democratic than Britain herself. But he chose to argue from the unsubstantiality of separate colonial existence, and the natural inclination of prosperous colonists to make for England, the moment their fortunes had been made. “The condition of colonial society,” he said, “is of a fluctuating character…. There is no similarity between the circumstances of our colonial fellow-subjects and those of our fellow-subjects in India. Our colonists are English; they come and go, they are careful to make fortunes, to invest their money in England; their interests are immense, ramified, complicated, and they have constant opportunities of improving and enjoying the relations which exist between themselves and their countrymen in the metropolis. Their relations to their Sovereign are ample, they satisfy them. The colonists are proud of those relations, they are interested in the titles of the Queen, they look forward to return when they leave England, they do return—in short they are Englishmen.”[Hansard, 9 March, 1876. The whole speech is an admirable example of Disraeli’s gift of irresponsible paradox].

It seems fair to argue from these instances that Disraeli, with all his imagination and insight, did not, even in 1876, understand the constitutional and social self-sufficiency of the greater colonies; or the nature of the bond which held them fast to the mother country. His consummate rhetorical skill persuaded the nation to be imperial, while he himself doubted the very possibility of permanence in an empire organized on the only lines—those of strict autonomy—which the colonists were willing to sanction.

So the party of the earlier British Empire distrusted the foundations laid by Durham and his group for a new structure; and behind all their proclamations of authority, there were ill-concealed fears of another declaration or succession of declarations of independence.

It is now time to turn to the central body of imperial opinion—that which used Durham’s views as the foundation of a new working theory of colonial development. Its chief exponents were the Whigs of the more liberal school, who counted Lord John Russell their representative and leader.

It was only at the end of a period dominated by other interests that Lord John Russell was able to turn his attention to colonies, and more particularly to Canada. Even in 1839, the leader of the House of Commons, and the politician on whom, after all, the fate of the Whig party depended, had many other claims on his attention. He was no theorist at general on the subject, and his interest in Canada was largely the product of events, not of his own will. But he came at a decisive moment in Canadian history; his tenure of the Colonial Office coincided with the period in which Durham’s Report exercised its greatest influence, and Russell, who had the politician’s faculty for flinging himself with all his force into the issue dominating the present, inaugurated what proved to be a new regime in colonial administration.

In attributing so decisive a part to Russell’s work at the Colonial Office, one need not estimate very highly his powers of initiative or imagination. It was Lord John Russell’s lot, here as in Parliamentary Reform, to read with honest eyes the defects of the existing system, to initiate a great and useful change, and then to predicate finality of an act, which was really only the beginning of greater changes. But in Canadian politics as in British, he must be credited with being better than his words, and with doing nothing to hinder a movement which he only partially understood.

His ideas have in part been criticized in relation to Lord Sydenham’s governor-generalship: in a sense, Sydenham was simply the Russell system incarnate. But it is well to examine these ideas as a whole. Russell was a Durhamite “with a difference.” Like Durham he planned a generous measure of self-government, but he was a stricter constitutional thinker than Durham. He reduced to a far finer point the difficulty which Durham only slightly felt, about the seat of ultimate authority and responsibility; and his instructions to Sydenham left no doubt as to the constitutional superior in Canada. With infinitely shrewder practical insight than his prompter, he refused to simplify the problem of executive responsibility, by making the council subject to the Assembly in purely domestic matters, and to the Crown and its representative in external matters. “Supposing,” he said, “that you could lay down this broad principle, and say that all external matters should be subject to the home government, and all internal matters should be governed according to the majority of the Assembly, could you carry that principle into effect? I say, we cannot abandon the responsibility which is cast upon us as Ministers of the Executive of this great Empire.”[Hansard, 3 June, 1839]

Ultimately the surrender had to be made, but it was well that Russell should have refused to consent to what was really a fallacy in Durham’s reasoning. In consequence of this position, the Whig leader regarded Bagot’s surrender as one, difficult perhaps to avoid, but unfortunate in its results, and he was an unflinching supporter of Metcalfe. He further declared that he thought Metcalfe’s council had an exaggerated view of their power, and that to yield to them would involve dangers to the connection.[Hansard, 30 May, 1844] The novelty involved in his policy lay, however, outside this point of constitutional logic: it was a matter of practice, not of theory. Not only did he support Sydenham in those practical reforms in which the new political life of Canada began, but in spite of his theory he really granted all save the form of full responsibility. So completely had he, and his agent Sydenham, undermined their own imperial position, that when Peel’s ministry fell in 1846, it was one of the first acts of Lord John Russell, now prime minister, to consent to the demolition of his own old theories. If he may not dispute with Grey the credit of having conceded genuine responsibility to Canada, at least he did not exercise his authority to forbid the grant.

It seems to me, indeed, that Russell definitely modified his position between 1841 and 1847. At the earlier date he had been a stout upholder of the supremacy of Britain in Canada, for he believed in the connection, and the connection depended on the retention of British supremacy. In the debate of January 16th, 1838, he argued thus for the Empire: “On the preservation of our colonies depends the continuance of our commercial marine; and on our commercial marine mainly depends our naval power; and on our naval power mainly depends the strength and supremacy of our arms.”[Hansard, 16 January, 1838].

It is worthy of note that Charles Buller took occasion to challenge this description of the pillars of empire—it seemed a poor theory to him to make the empire a stalking-horse for the commerce and interests of the mother country. But as events taught Russell surely that the casuistry of 1839 was false, and that Responsible Government was both a deeper and a broader thing than he had counted it, and yet inevitable, he accepted the more radical position. At the same time, he either came to lay less stress on the unity of Empire, or he was forced to acknowledge that, since Home Rule must be granted, and since with Home Rule separation seemed natural, Britain had better practise resignation in view of a possible disruption. The best known expression of this phase in Russell’s thought is his speech on Colonial Administration in 1850: “I anticipate, indeed, with others that some of the colonies may so grow in population and wealth that they may say, ‘Our strength is sufficient to enable us to be independent of England. The link is now become onerous to us; the time is come when we think we can, in amity and alliance with England, maintain our independence.’ I do not think that that time is yet approaching. But let us make them as far as possible fit to govern themselves … let them increase in wealth and population; and whatever may happen, we of this great empire shall have the consolation of saying that we have contributed to the happiness of the world.”[Walpole, Life of Lord John Russell, pp. 339-40]

It is possible to argue that because Russell admitted that the time for separation was not yet approaching he was therefore an optimist. But the evidence leans rather to the less glorious side. It was this speech which kindled Elgin into a passion and made him bid Grey renounce for himself and his leader the habit of telling the colonies that the colonial is a provisional existence. The same speech, too, extorted complaints from Robert Baldwin, the man whom Sydenham and Russell had once counted half a traitor. “I never saw him so much moved,” wrote Elgin, to whom Baldwin had frankly said about a recent meeting. “My audience was disposed to regard a prediction of this nature proceeding from a Prime Minister, less as a speculative abstraction than as one of that class of prophecies which work their own fulfilment.”[Walpole, Life of Lord John Russell, pp. 339-40] The speech was not an accidental or occasional flash of rhetoric. The mind of the Whig leader, acquiescing now in the completeness of Canadian local powers, and reading with disquiet the signs of the times in the form of Canadian turbulence, seems to have turned to speculate on the least harmful form which separation might take. Of this there is direct evidence in a private letter from Grey to Elgin: “Lord John in a letter I had from him yesterday, expresses a good deal of anxiety as to the prospects of Canada, and reverts to the old idea of forming a federal union of all the British provinces, in order to give them something more to think of than their mere local squabbles;[The reference is to the Rebellion Losses Act riots] and he says that if to effect this a separation of the two Canadas were necessary he should see no objection to it. His wish in forming such a union would be to bring about such a state of things, that, if you should lose our North American provinces, they might be likely to become an independent state, instead of being merged in the Union.”[Elgin-Grey Correspondence: Grey to Elgin, 8 August, 1849].

Russell moved then at this period through a most interesting development of views. His initial position was a blend of firm imperialism and generous liberal concession, the latter more especially inspired by Durham. As his genuine sympathies with liberty and democracy operated on his political views, these steadily changed in the direction of a more complete surrender to Canadian demands. But, since, in spite of his sympathies, he still remained logical, and since he had believed the connection to depend on the governor-general’s supremacy, the modification of that supremacy involved the weakening of his hopes of empire. If the change seem somewhat to his discredit, his best defence lies in the fact that Peel, who made a very similar modification of his mind on Canadian politics, was also contemplating in these years a similar separation.

“The utility of our connexion with Canada,” he said in 1844, “must depend upon its being continued with perfect goodwill by the majority of the population. It would be infinitely better that that connexion should be discontinued, rather than that it should be continued by force and against the general feeling and conviction of the people.”[Hansard, 30 May, 1844] Indeed, Russell seems to have been accompanied on his dolorous journey by all the Peelites and not a few of the Whigs. “There begins to prevail in the House of Commons,” wrote Grey to Elgin in 1849, “and I am sorry to say in the highest quarters, an opinion (which I believe to be utterly erroneous) that we have no interest in preserving our colonies and ought therefore to make no sacrifice for that purpose. Peel, Graham, and Gladstone, if they do not avow this opinion as openly as Cobden and his friends, yet betray very clearly that they entertain it, nor do I find some members of the Cabinet free from it.”[Elgin-Grey Correspondence: Grey to Elgin, 18 May, 1849].

Meanwhile, the direction of colonial affairs had fallen to the writer of the letter just quoted: from the formation of the Russell ministry in 1846 until its fall, Earl Grey was the dominant force in British colonial policy. Unlike Russell, Grey was not so much a politician interested in the great parliamentary game, as an expert who had devoted most of his attention to colonial and economic subjects. Consciously or unconsciously, he had imbibed many of Wakefield’s ideas, and in that period of triumphant free trade, he came to office resolute to administer the colonies on free-trade principles. It said much for the fixity and consistency of his ideas of colonial administration that, unlike Russell, Buller, and others, he had not been misled by the Metcalfe incident. “The truth is,” he said of Metcalfe, “he did not comprehend responsible government at all, nor from his Indian experience is this wonderful.”[Elgin-Grey Correspondence: Grey to Elgin, 6 April, 1849].

The most comprehensive description of the Grey regime is that it practised laissez faire principles in colonial administration as they never had been {268} practised before. Under him Canada first enjoyed the advantages or disadvantages of free trade, and escaped from the shackles of the Navigation Laws. Grey and Elgin co-operated to bring the Clergy Reserve troubles to an end, although the Whigs fell before the final steps could be taken. Grey secured imperial sanction for changes in the Union Act of 1840, granting the French new privileges for their language, and the colony free control of its own finances. But all these were subordinate in importance to the attitude of the new minister towards the whole question of Canadian autonomy, and its relation to the Imperial Parliament. That attitude may be examined in relation to the responsibility of the Canadian executive, the powers of the Imperial Parliament, the occasions on which these powers might be fitly used, and the bearing of all the innovations on the position of Canada within the British Empire.

Grey’s policy with regard to Responsible Government was simple. As Canadians viewed the term, and within the very modest limits set to it by them, he surrendered the whole position. So much has already been said on this point in connection with Elgin, that it need not be further elaborated. Yet, since there might linger a suspicion that the {269} policy was that rather of the governor than of the minister, Grey’s position may be given in a despatch written to Sir John Harvey in Nova Scotia, before Elgin went to Canada.

“The object,” wrote Grey, “with which I recommend to you this course is that of making it apparent that any transfer, which may take place, of political power from the hands of one party to those of another is the result, not of an act of yours, but of the wishes of the people themselves, as shown by the difficulty experienced by the retiring party in carrying on the government of the Province according to the forms of the Constitution. To this I attach great importance; I have therefore to instruct you to abstain from changing your Executive Council until it shall become perfectly clear that they are unable with such fair support from yourself as they have a right to expect, to carry on the government of the province satisfactorily, and command the confidence of the Legislature…. In giving all fair and proper support to your Council for the time being, you will carefully avoid any acts which can possibly be supposed to imply the slightest personal objection to their opponents, and also refuse to assent to any measures which may be proposed to you by your Council, which may appear to you to involve an improper exercise of the authority of the Crown for party rather than for public objects. In exercising however this power of refusing to sanction measures which may be submitted to you by your Council, you must recollect that this power of opposing a check upon extreme measures, proposed by the party for the time in the Government, depends entirely for its efficacy upon its being used sparingly and with the greatest possible discretion. A refusal to accept advice tendered to you by your Council is a legitimate ground for its members to tender to you their resignation—a course they would doubtless adopt, should they feel that the subject on which a difference had arisen between you and themselves was one upon which public opinion would be in their favour. Should it prove to be so, concession to their views must sooner or later become inevitable, since it cannot be too distinctly acknowledged that it is neither possible nor desirable to carry on the government of any of the British Provinces in North America, in opposition to the opinion of the inhabitants.”[Earl Grey to Sir John Harvey, 3 November, 1846].

In strict accordance with this plan, Grey gave Elgin the most loyal support in introducing responsible government into Canada, and, in a note written not long after Papineau had once more awakened the political echoes with a distinctly disloyal address, he expressed his willingness to include even the old rebel in the ministerial arrangement, should that be insisted on by the leaders of a party which could command a majority.[Elgin-Grey Correspondence: Grey to Elgin, 22 February, 1848].

Complete as was the concession made by Grey to local claims, it would, nevertheless, be a grave error to think that he left no space for the assertion of imperial authority. No doubt it was part of his system to reduce to a minimum the occasions on which interference should be necessary, but that such occasions might occur, and demand sudden and powerful action from Britain, he ever held. Even in matters of a character purely domestic, he believed, with Lord John Russell, that intervention might be necessary, and he desired to prevent danger, not by minimizing the powers of the imperial authority, but by exercising them with great discretion[Grey, Colonial Policy, i. p. 25]. It was perhaps with this conservation of central power in view that he was willing to transfer to the British treasury the responsibility of paying the salary of the governor-general, provided the colonists would take over some part of the expenses and difficulties of Canadian defence. But the extent to which he was prepared to exalt the supremacy is best illustrated in the control of imperial commerce. A great change had just been made in the economic system of Britain. Free trade was then to its adherents not an arguable position, but a kind of gospel; and men like Grey, who had something of the propagandist about them, were inclined to compel others to come in. Now, unfortunately for Canada, free trade appeared there first rather as foe than as friend.

As has already been seen, the measures of 1846 overturned the arrangement made by Stanley in 1843, whereby a preference given to Canadian flour had stimulated a great activity in the milling and allied industries; and the removal of the restrictions imposed by the Navigation Acts did not take place till 1849. At the same time the United States, the natural market for Canadian products, showed little inclination to listen to talk of reciprocity; and the Canadians, seemingly deprived of pre-existing advantages by Peel’s action, talked of retaliation as a means of bettering their position, at least in relation to the United States. Grey, however, was an absolute believer in the magic powers of free trade. “When we rejected all considerations of what is called reciprocity,” he wrote to Elgin, “and boldly got rid of our protective duties without inquiring whether other nations would meet us or not, the effect was immediately seen in the increase of our exports, and the prosperity of our manufactures.”[Elgin-Grey Correspondence: Grey to Elgin, 5 December, 1850].

Canada, then, in his opinion could retaliate most effectively, not by setting up a tariff against the United States, but by opening her ports more freely then before. He had a vision, comparable although in contrast, to that of believers in an imperial tariff, of an empire with its separate parts bound to each other by a general freedom of trade. Besides all this, he had a firm trust that the evils which other nations less free than Britain might for a time inflict on her trade by their prohibitions, would shortly end, since all would be convinced by the example of Britain and would follow it. Under these circumstances he set imperial policy against local prejudice, and wrote to his governor-general: “I do trust you will be able to prevent the attempt to enter upon that silliest of all silly policies, the {274} meeting of commercial restrictions by counter restrictions; indeed it is a matter to be very seriously considered, whether we can avoid disallowing any acts of this kind which may be passed.”[Elgin-Grey Correspondence: Grey to Elgin, 25 October, 1849] (1)

Resources

Notes

1. J. L. Morison, “British Supremacy & Canadian Self-Government 1839-1854” (1919), Toronto, S. B. Gundy

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This entry was last updated: October 29, 2016