Rebellion Losses Bill in Canada
Historical comntext of the Rebellion Losses Bill, and the Montreal riots of 1849
The Bill which caused the trouble had been introduced to complete a scheme of compensation for all those who had suffered loss in the late Rebellion, whether French or English, and had been passed by majorities in both houses; but while there seemed no valid reason for disallowing it, Lord Elgin suspected trouble—indeed, at first, he viewed the measure with personal disapproval.The obvious point, made by the Tories in Canada, and by Gladstone in England, was that the new scheme of compensation was certain to recompense many who had actually been in arms in the Rebellion, although their guilt might not be provable in a court of law. See Gladstone in Hansard, 14 June, 1849.
He might have refused permission to bring in the bill; but the practical consequences of such a refusal were too serious to be accepted. “Only imagine,” he wrote, “how difficult it would have been to discover a justification for my conduct, if at a moment when America was boiling over with bandits and desperadoes, and when the leaders of every faction in the Union, with the view of securing the Irish vote for the presidential election, were vying with each other in abuse of England, and subscribing funds for the Irish Republican Union, I had brought on such a crisis in Canada by refusing to allow my administration to bring in a bill to carry out the recommendation of Lord Metcalfe’s commissioners.”[Elgin to Grey, concerning Grey’s Colonial Policy, 8 October, 1852. Metcalfe’s policy in the matter had really forced Elgin’s hand].
He might have dissolved Parliament, but, as he rightly pointed out, “it would be rather a strong measure to have recourse to dissolution because a Parliament, elected one year ago under the auspices of the present opposition, passed by a majority of more than two to one a measure introduced by the Government.” There remained only the possibility of reserving the bill for approval or rejection at home. A weaker man would have taken this easy and fatal way of evading responsibility; but Elgin rose to the height of his vocation, when he explained his reason for acting on his own initiative. “I should only throw upon her Majesty’s Government, or (as it would appear to the popular eye here) on Her Majesty herself, a responsibility which rests, and ought I think to rest, on my own shoulders.”[Elgin-Grey Correspondence: Elgin to Grey, 14 March, 1849] He gave his assent to the bill, suffered personal violence at the hands of the Montreal crowd and the opposition, but, since he stood firm, he triumphed, and saved both the dignity of the Crown and the friendship of the French for his government.
The other instance of his skill in combining Canadian autonomy with British supremacy is less important, but, in a way, more extraordinary in its subtlety. As a servant of the Crown, he had to furnish despatches, which were liable to be published as parliamentary papers, and so to be perused by Canadian politicians. Elgin had therefore to reckon with two publics—the British Parliament, which desired information, and the Canadian Parliament, which desired to maintain its dignity and freedom. Before the Montreal outrage, and when it was extremely desirable to leave matters as vague as possible, Elgin simply refrained from giving details to the Colonial Office. “I could not have made my official communication to you in reference to this Bill, which you could have laid before Parliament, without stating or implying an irrevocable decision on this point. To this circumstance you must ascribe the fact that you have not heard from me officially.”[Elgin-Grey Correspondence: Elgin to Grey, 12 April, 1849].
With even greater shrewdness, at a later date, he made Grey expunge, in his book on Colonial Policy, details of the outrage which followed the passing of the Act; for, said he, “I am strongly of opinion that nothing but evil can result from the publication, at this period, of a detailed and circumstantial statement of the disgraceful proceedings which took place after the Bill passed…. The surest way to arrest a process of conversion is to dwell on the errors of the past, and to place in a broad light the contrast between present sentiments and those of an earlier date.”[Elgin’s letter of 8 October, 1852, criticizing Grey’s book] In constitutional affairs manners make, not merely the statesman, but the possibility of government; and Elgin’s highest quality as a constitutionalist was, not so much his understanding of the machinery of government, as his knowledge of the constitutional temper, and the need within it of humanity and common-sense.
Great as was Elgin’s achievement in rectifying Canadian constitutional practice, his solution of the nationalist difficulty in Lower Canada was possibly a greater triumph of statesmanship; for the present modus vivendi, which still shows no signs of breaking down, dates from the years of Elgin’s governorship. The decade which included his rule in Canada was pre-eminently the epoch of nationalism. Italy, Germany, and Hungary, with Mazzini as their prophet, were all struggling for the acknowledgment of their national claims, and within the British Islands themselves, the Irish nationalists furnished, in Davis and the writers to The Nation, disciples and apostles of the new gospel. It is always dangerous to trace European influences across the Atlantic; but there is little doubt that as the French rebellion of 1837 owed something to Europe, so the arch-rebel Papineau’s paper, L’Avenir, echoed in an empty blustering fashion, the cries of the nationalist revolution of 1848.[Elgin kept very closely in touch with the sentiments of the Canadian press, French and English. See his letters passim]
Elgin found on his arrival that British administration had thrown every element in French-Canadian politics into headlong opposition to itself. How dangerous the situation was, one may infer from {211} the disquieting rumours of the ambitions of the American Union, and from the passions and memories of injustice which floods of unkempt and wretched Irish immigrants were bringing with them to their new homes in America. In Elgin’s second year of office, 1848, he had to face the possibility of a rising under the old leaders of 1837. His solution of the difficulty proceeded pari passu with his constitutional work. In the latter he had seen that he must remove the disquieting subject of “responsible government” from the party programme of the progressives, and the politic surrender of 1847 had gained his end. Towards French nationalism he acted in the same spirit. As has already been seen, he was conscious of the political shortcomings of the French. Yet there was nothing penal in his attitude towards them, and he saw, with a clearness to which Durham never attained, how idle all talk of anglicizing French Canada must be. “I for one,” he said, “am deeply convinced of the impolicy of all such attempts to denationalize the French. Generally speaking, they produce the opposite effect from that intended, causing the flame of national prejudice and animosity to burn more fiercely.”[Elgin-Grey Correspondence: Elgin to Grey, 4 May, 1848]
But how could the pathological phase of nationalism be ended? His first Tory advisers suggested the old trick of making converts, but the practice had long since been found useless. His next speculation was whether the French could be made to take sides as Liberals or Tories, apart altogether from nationalist considerations. But the political solidarity of the French had been a kind of trades-unionism, claiming to guard French interests against an actual menace to their very existence as a nation within the empire; and they were certain to act only with Baldwin and his friends, the one party which had regarded them as other than traitors or suspects, or at best tools.
No complete solution of the problem was possible; but when Elgin surrendered to the progressives, he was making concessions also to the French—by admitting them to a recognized place within the constitution, and doing so without reservation. The joint ministry of La Fontaine and Baldwin was, in a sense, the most satisfactory answer that could be made to the difficulty. From the moment of its creation Elgin and Canada were safe. He remained doubtful during part of 1848, for Papineau had been elected by acclamation to the Parliament which held its first session that year; and he “had searched in vain … through the French organs of public opinion for a frank and decided expression of hostility to the anti-British sentiments propounded in Papineau’s address.”[Elgin-Grey Correspondence: Elgin to Grey, 7 January, 1848] He did not at first understand that La Fontaine, not Papineau, was the French leader, and that the latter represented only himself and a few Rouges of violent but unsubstantial revolutionary opinions. Nevertheless, he gave his French ministers his confidence, and he applied his singular powers of winning men to appeasing French discontent. As early as May, 1848, he saw how the land lay—that French Canada was fundamentally conservative, and that discontent was mainly a consequence of sheer stupidity and error on the part of England. “Who will venture to say,” he asked, “that the last hand which waves the British flag on American ground may not be that of a French Canadian?”[Elgin-Grey Correspondence: Elgin to Grey, 4 May, 1848]
His final settlement of the question came in 1849, and the introduction of that Rebellion Losses Bill which has been already mentioned. The measure was, in the main, an act of justice to French sufferers from the disturbances created by the Rebellion; for they had naturally shared but slightly in earlier and partial schemes of compensation; and the opposition to the bill was directed quite frankly against the French inhabitants of Canada as traitors, who deserved, not recompense, but punishment. Now there were many cases of real hardship, like that of the inhabitants of St. Benoit, a village which Sir John Colborne had pledged himself to protect when he occupied it for military purposes, but which, in his absence, the loyalist volunteers had set on fire and destroyed. The inhabitants might be disloyal, but in the eyes of an equal justice a wrong had been done, and must be righted. The idea of the bill was not new—it was not Elgin’s bill; and if his predecessors had been right, then the French politicians were justified in claiming that the system of compensation already initiated must be followed till all legitimate claims had been met.
It would be disingenuous to deny that Elgin calculated on the pacific influence which his support of the bill would exert in Lower Canada. “I was aware of two facts,” he told Grey in 1852: “Firstly, that M. La Fontaine would be unable to retain the support of his countrymen if he failed to introduce a measure of this description; and secondly, that my refusal would be taken by him and his friends as a proof that they had not my confidence.” But his chief concern was to hold the balance level, to redress an actual grievance, and to repress the fury of Canadian Tories whose unrestrained action would have flung Canada into a new and complicated struggle of races and parties. “I am firmly convinced,” he told Grey in June, speaking of American election movements at this time, “that the only thing which prevented an invasion of Canada was the political contentment prevailing among the French Canadians and Irish Catholics”; and that political contentment was the result of Elgin’s action in supporting his ministers. A happy chance, utilized to the full by Elgin’s cautious wisdom, had enabled him to do the French what they counted a considerable service; and the rage and disorder of the opposition only played the more surely into the hands of the governor-general, and established, beyond any risk of alteration, French loyalty to him personally.[See an interesting reference in a letter to Sir Charles Wood, written from India. Walrond]
From that day, with trivial intervals or incidents of misunderstanding, the British and the French in Canada have played the political game together. It was in the La Fontaine-Baldwin ministry that {216} the joint action, within the Canadian parties, of the two races had its real beginning; and while the traditions and idiosyncrasies of Quebec were too ingrained and fundamental to admit of modification beyond a certain point, Canadian parliamentary life was henceforth based on the free co-operation of French and English, in a party system which tried to forget the distinction of race. From this time, too, Elgin began to discern the conservative genius of the French people, and to prophesy that, when Baldwin’s moderate reforming influence should have been withdrawn, the French would naturally incline to unite with the moderate Conservatives—the combination on which, in actual fact, John A. Macdonald based his long control of power in Canada. (1)
Cosequences
The storm raised by the Rebellion Losses Bill did not soon sink to a calm. It did not end with rabbling the viceroy, burning the House of Parliament, homicide, and mob rule in the streets of Montreal. In the British House of Commons the whole matter was thoroughly discussed. Young Mr Disraeli, the dandified Jewish novelist, held that there were no rebels in Upper Canada, while young Mr Gladstone, ‘the rising hope of those stern and unbending Tories,’ proved that there were virtual rebels who would be rewarded for their treason under the Canadian statute. In a letter to The Times Hincks showed, in rebuttal, that rebels in Upper Canada had already received compensation by the Act of a Tory government. Who says A must also say B. Between the arguments of Gladstone and Hincks it is perfectly clear that the Rebellion Losses Bill was anything but a perfect measure. Its passage had one more important reaction, the Annexation movement of 1849.
This episode in Canadian history is usually slurred over by our writers. It is considered to be a national disgrace, a shameful confession of cowardice, like an attempt at suicide in a man. It did undoubtedly show want of faith in the future. Those who organized the movement did ‘despair of the republic.’ But it is possible to blame them too much. Annexation to the United States was in the air. Lord Elgin writes that it was considered to be the remedy for every kind of Canadian discontent. He was haunted by the fear of it all through his tenure of office. Annexation had been preached by the Radical journals for years in Canada; and it was confidently expected by politicians in the United States. As late as 1866 a bill providing for the admission of the states of Upper Canada, Nova Scotia, etc., to the Union passed two readings in the House of Representatives. The Dominion elections of a quarter of a century later (1891) gave the death-blow to the notion that Annexation was Canada’s manifest destiny; but the idea died hard.
Action and reaction are equal and opposite. Embittered by defeat, the very party that had stood like a rock for British connection now moved definitely for separation. The circular issued by the Annexation Association of Montreal is a document too seldom studied, but it repays study. In tone it is the reverse of inflammatory; it is markedly temperate and reasonable. After a dispassionate review of the present situation, it considers the possibilities that lie before the colony—federal union, independence, or reciprocity with the United States. All that Goldwin Smith was to say about Canada’s manifest destiny is said here. His ideas and arguments are perfectly familiar to the Annexationists of ’49. The appeal at the close contains this sentence:
“Fellow-Colonists, We have thus laid before you our views and convictions on a momentous question—involving a change which, though contemplated by many of us with varied feelings and emotions, we all believe to be inevitable;—one which it is our duty to provide for, and lawfully to promote.” (2)
Resources
Notes
- J. L. Morison, “British Supremacy & Canadian Self-Government 1839-1854” (1919), Toronto, S. B. Gundy
- Archibald MacMechan, “Popular Govrerment. A Chronicle of the Union of 1841” (1916), Toronto, Glasgow, Brook and Company
See Also