Contents:
- Interpretation of Statutes
- Introduction and the modern principle
- In General
- Purpose of legislation
- Intention of legislature
- Avoidance of unreasonable results
- Sensible and not literal interpretation
- Interpretation in accordance with reason and convenience
- Ordinary meaning of words
- Conflict with other statutes
- Ambiguity defined/h3> In the case of Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex et al. (2002), 287 N.R. 248; 166 B.C.A.C. 1; 271 W.A.C. 1 (S.C.C.), as one of the cases that consider what constitutes an ambiguity, and where Construction where meaning is not plain, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that absent ambiguity, the words of a statute were to be interpreted in their ordinary and grammatical sense – Other principles of statutory interpretation, such as strict construction of penal statutes and the ‘Charter values’ presumption, applied only where there was ambiguity – Ambiguity occurred only where the words of a provision were ‘reasonably capable of more than one meaning’ – By necessity, the ‘entire context’ of a provision must be considered to determine whether the provision was reasonably capable of multiple interpretations – The court restated that ‘it is only when genuine ambiguity arises between two or more plausible readings, each equally in accordance with the intentions of the statute, that the courts need to resort to external interpretative aids, including “other principles of interpretation”‘ – The court stated that ‘ambiguity cannot reside in the mere fact that several courts — or, for that matter, several doctrinal writers — have come to differing conclusions on the interpretation of a given provision’ – See paragraphs 28 to 30.” Interpretation, aids, legislative history
- Interpretation, aids, similar statutes
- Interpretation, aids, books and comments
- Interpretation, aids, bilingual statutes
- Interpretation, aids, punctuation
- Interpretation, aids, presumptions
- Interpretation, aids, presumptions, against alteration of the law
- Interpretation, aids, presumptions, against abridgment of common law rights
Interpretation of Statutes
Based on the Compilation made by Eric B. Appleby (2007):
Introduction and the modern principle
The leading Canadian text on the interpretation of statutes is Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction of Statutes. Elmer Driedger in the first edition of his text, in 1974, stated what he called the modern principle as follows: “Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of the Act are to be read in their entire context, in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.”
The modern principle has been approved repeatedly by Canadian courts including the Supreme Court of Canada – see Rizzo and Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Bankrupt), Re, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27; 221 N.R. 241; 106 O.A.C. 1. The elements of the modern principle are: 1. Textual meaning, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words; 2. Legislative intent, including the scheme and object of the statute; and 3. Compliance with legal norms, including values found in the common law and in constitutional documents. When an interpreter applies the elements of the modern principle to a statute, and the question is whether the statute applies to particular facts, the interpreter may be required to apply case law and the rules of interpretation that have been evolving for hundreds of years. For example, there are many general rules, plus rules regarding extrinsic aids, intrinsic aids, presumptions, etc., and there are rules found in statutes, such as, the Interpretation Acts, Regulation Acts, Statute Revision Acts, Official Languages Acts, etc. After applying the rules of interpretation, a final question is whether the interpretation adopted is appropriate – see Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction of Statutes (4th Ed.), p. 3. This final inquiry determines: – whether the interpretation adopted is plausible given the legislative text; – whether the interpretation adopted promotes the legislative intent; and – whether the interpretation adopted complies with legal norms, e.g. is it reasonable and just.
In General
In the case of Verdun v. Toronto-Dominion Bank (1996), 203 N.R. 60; 94 O.A.C. 211 (S.C.C.), the headnote stated in part: “Interpretation – General – The Supreme Court of Canada stated that ‘the first step in a question of statutory interpretation is always an examination of the language of the statute itself’ – See paragraph 22.”
Purpose of legislation
In the case of R. v. Hill (1975), 6 N.R. 413 (S.C.C.), the headnote stated in part: “Interpretation – General principles – Purpose of legislation – Laskin, C.J.C., of the Supreme Court of Canada stated that judges cannot escape making a ‘determination of purpose, or policy, regardless of the canon that is invoked; indeed, we make it when we purport to apply one canon rather than another’ – See paragraph 57.”
Intention of legislature
In the case of Minister of National Revenue v. Schwartz (1996), 193 N.R. 241 (S.C.C.), about the determination of the intention of the legislature, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that ‘… policy concerns … should not and cannot be relied on in disregard of Parliament’s clearly expressed intention: “interpretatio cessat in claris”‘ – See paragraph 50.”
Avoidance of unreasonable results
In the case of Cormier v. Board of School Trustees, District 19 (1974), 8 N.B.R.(2d) 330 (C.A.), about the avoidance of unreasonable results, the New Brunswick Court of Appeal stated that an interpretation of a statute which produces an unreasonable result should be rejected – See paragraph 15.”
Sensible and not literal interpretation
In the case of McMonagle v. Westminister (City) (1990), 109 N.R. 209 (H.L.), about a sensible and not a literal interpretation, General principles – Sensible and not literal interpretation – The House of Lords considered the problem arising from excess wordage that has the effect of defeating the very purpose of the legislation – In certain instances the offending surplusage can be disregarded – Their Lordships stated that the ‘presumption that every word in a statute must be given some effective meaning is a strong one, but the courts have on occasion been driven to disregard particular words or phrases when, by giving effect to them, the operation of the statute would be rendered insensible, absurd or ineffective to achieve its evident purpose.’ – See paragraphs 11 to 13.”
Interpretation in accordance with reason and convenience
In the case of Canadian Acceptance Corp. v. Mowatt (1970), 2 N.B.R.(2d) 390 (Q.B.), the court stated at para. 26: “[26] Craies on Statute Law, sixth edition, at p. 13, quotes Lord Hobart in Sheffield v. Ratcliffe (1616) Hob. 334-346, with reference to rules of interpretation by the courts as stating that statutes are interpreted ‘by that liberty and authority which judges have over statute law according to reason and best convenience to mould them to the truest and best use’.”
Ordinary meaning of words
In the case of Canada Mortgage and Housing Corp. v. Hagblom, Hagblom, Canada Permanent Trust Co. and Wallace Construction Specialities Ltd. (1998), 237 N.R. 373; 122 B.C.A.C. 1; 200 W.A.C. 1 (S.C.C.), about one of the cases that consider the ordinary meaning of words, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that ‘statutory provisions should be read to give the words their most obvious ordinary meaning which accords with the context and purpose of the enactment in which they occur; … It is only when genuine ambiguity arises between two or more plausible readings, each equally in accordance with the intentions of the statute, that the courts need to resort to external interpretive aids.’ – See paragraph 14.”
Conflict with other statutes
In the case of Diamond Estate v. Robbins (2006), 253 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 16; 759 A.P.R. 16 (Nfld. C.A.), about Construction where meaning is not plain – General principles – Avoidance of conflict with other statutes – The Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal stated that ‘in statutory interpretation there is a presumptive rule of coherence, i.e., that the legislature did not intend to enact inconsistent provisions in statutes dealing with the same subject matter. “As a result, where possible, potentially conflicting legislation is interpreted so that inconsistency or conflict is avoided”. … It follows that where provisions in separate statutes can apply without conflict both will apply. … Where there is conflict, such that the provisions in separate statutes cannot both apply, other interpretative rules assist in the resolution thereof. One of these is reflected in the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant (a general provision does not derogate from a special one), also known as the rule of implied exception’ – See paragraphs 49 to 51.”